[Swan-dev] Fwd: [Cryptography] on brute forcing 3DES to attack SIMs

[Paul Wouters]

Should we think about removing 3des from the default proposal set?

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

> From: ianG <iang at iang.org>
> Date: January 1, 2015 at 12:50:52 EST
> To: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography at metzdowd.com>
> Subject: [Cryptography] on brute forcing 3DES to attack SIMs
> 
> 
> 
> http://threatpost.com/majority-of-4g-usb-modems-sim-cards-exploitable/110139
> 
> “To brute-force DES keys, we use a set of field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), which became trendy for Bitcoin mining a couple of years ago and got cheaper after the hype was over,” the researchers wrote. “The speed of our 8 modules *ZTEX 1.15y board with the price tag of 2,000 Euro is 245.760 Mcrypt/sec. It is enough to obtain the key within 3 days.”
> 
> That was their fastest brute-force. If they had a partially known 3DES key, they could break it in 10 days.
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